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Abstract
In this work, we assess how organization of recruitment in large companies
affects ethnic discrimination. We consider large multi-establishment compa-
nies and distinguish two types of organization of recruitment: hiring made
through a human resources (HR) department at a centralized level of the com-
pany and hiring made only at the level of the establishment concerned by the
position, generally by managers in charge of recruitment. Our results indicate
that access to a centralized HR department in the selection of applications has
an important effect on the level of discrimination: This type of organization of
recruitment results in a significant decrease in the probability that the applicant
of presumed ”French” origin is selected alone.
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1 Introduction
In France, as in many countries, several experiments conducted in recent years
have revealed a relatively widespread discriminatory behavior among employers
(see Rich (2014), Baert (2017), Bertrand and Duflo (2016) and Neumark (2018)) for
literature reviews). Discrimination in hiring related to origin is among the most
commonly studied because it is easier to measure from experimental schemes
than other types of discrimination (e.g., age, disability, or physical appearance).
In France, several correspondence studies have revealed that workers of ”North
African” origin are particularly concerned by the phenomenon (Foroni and Cediey
(2008), Petit et al. (2015), Berson (2013), and Edo and Jacquemet (2013) among oth-
ers)1. With similar characteristics, applicants of ”French” origin are up to three
times more likely to receive positive callbacks from employers than applicants of
”North African” origin, depending on the characteristics of the experiment (e.g.,
jobs, period, or characteristics of applicants). Several recent works have studied dif-
ferent actions to prevent discrimination, and some have been in the French context.
Behaghel et al. (2015) show that setting up an experimental anonymous resume
policy for some vacancies is not efficient for ethnic minorities. Fremigacci et al.
(2015) assess the potential impact of merit labeling by making the ”best appren-
tice in France” distinction appear on the resume. However, this attempt was not
effective in reducing discrimination because, although everyone benefits from this
distinction, applicants of ”French” origin benefit more than other groups. Edo and
Jacquemet (2013) evaluate the impact of a satisfactory level of French on resumes.
Their results are more encouraging than the results in the literature because such a
signal makes it possible to reduce the differences observed. However, overall, few
tools have proven effective in fighting discrimination in recruitment. In a 2016 lit-
erature review, Bertrand and Duflo (2016) confirm this observation and stress that
more research on this point is worth pursuing.
In this article, we assess the effect of the organization of recruitment in large com-
panies on the degree of hiring discrimination. More specifically, we compare the
intervention of a centralized human resources (HR) department to the selection
made only within the establishment concerned by the position, generally by a man-
ager responsible for recruitment. Notably, HR professionals are better trained and
more aware than other recruiters regarding discrimination. HR professionals are
1French worker with a ”North African” sounding name. Similarly, ”French” origin designates a
French worker with a ”French” sounding name.
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also less influenced by local constraints that can generate discrimination (e.g., con-
forming to consumer preferences or seeking to maintain homogeneous teams to
facilitate their management). Finally, HR professionals also have more time to de-
vote to the selection of applications and therefore make their choices less often on
the basis of ethnic stereotypes (Chugh, 2004).
To conduct our study, we use the data from a correspondence study realized by the
Ministry of Labor. The aim was to establish a dialogue with each company on their
recruitment practices on the basis of experimental results and encourage them to
implement policies to prevent discrimination. This dialogue was an opportunity to
gather information related to the recruitment process for each job offer, in addition
to those related to the experience design. Thus, we distinguished recruitment for
which the selection was made through a centralized HR department of the com-
pany (e.g., at national and regional levels), by an external service provider, or by
a person in charge of hiring if the recruitment was managed at only the level of
the establishment the offer concerns. The data from this testing have so far been
used to provide only raw results to the companies concerned. (Foroni et al., 2016)
show the outline of the protocol and the results by gender and level of employment
(manager or employee).
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of centralized HR recruitment on the degree
of discrimination in large companies. Approximately two thirds of the tested job
offers are managed in this manner, the other job offers are managed solely at the
establishment level. Notably, because we consider very large companies, the or-
ganization of recruitment varies across job offers and not only across companies.
Indeed, data show intra-firm heterogeneity in terms of recruitment organization
for many companies. Next, because the organization of recruitment is potentially
endogenous, we use an instrument to evaluate a causal effect. We exploit the infor-
mation regarding whether the tested job offer is from a company that developed a
franchise network or from a franchisee. The belonging of the establishment (or the
brand in the case of a franchise) to a company with a franchise network leads to
an exogenous increase in the probability that the selection only occurs within the
establishment concerned. On the one hand, the existence of franchises is linked to
a culture/practice of institutional autonomy for the enterprise as a whole; on the
other hand, the franchised establishments are enterprises and have full indepen-
dence beside the parent company. Moreover, according to the literature (Blair and
Lafontaine, 2005), the determinants of large companies’ choice to develop a fran-
chise network are essentially linked to their type of activity. There is no evidence
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of a direct link with employers’ discriminatory behavior.
Our results suggests that acting on the organization of recruitment in large compa-
nies can be considered a relatively effective tool in the fight against discrimination
in recruitment, at least as far as the first stage of recruitment is concerned. In both
cases, there remains a gap between the callback rates for the two types of appli-
cations : Centralized HR departments lead to a decrease in the probability that
”French” applicants will be preferred.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the correspondence study
and its results depending on the organization of recruitment. Section 3 discusses
the influence of the organization of the recruitment process on the degree of dis-
crimination. Section 4 concludes.
2 Discrimination by HR organization
In this section, we first present the features of the experiment conducted by the
French Ministry of Labor. Then we exploit data collected to identify hiring dis-
crimination and show the results by HR organization.
2.1 Experiment
The experiment behind the data used in this article has several specific features.
Unlike most experiments in which each company is generally tested only once,
this experiment comprised responding, for 4 months, to several dozen offers per
company. The ambition was to meet the Ministry of Labor’s objective, namely, to
carry out a sufficient number of tests to obtain exploitable results for each com-
pany. The data have a particularity such that they concern only large companies
(more than 1,000 employees), which were all subsequently met by the Ministry of
Labor after the experiment. This dialogue made it possible to collect, or possibly
confirm, a certain amount of information on the organization of recruitment of each
company and to know that the experiment was not detected. In particular, for each
application, we know whether recruitment was carried out solely at the level of
the establishment concerned or through a centralized HR department of the com-
pany.2 Studying hiring discrimination in large companies is relatively original and
2We consider HR department of the company or ”entity” - subsidiary, brand, company, etc. -
centralized at national, regional, etc. level. However, in 3% of the cases, the selection of applications
was made by an external service provider. Insofar as, as for centralized HR departments, these are
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results in new research questions. In particular, these companies generally have
professional HR functions, independent of other departments, which may affect
the degree of discrimination. According to our review of the literature, no other
correspondence studies have analyzed the impact of the recruitment organization
on discrimination.
Appendix A provides details on the experiment. Overall, we retain 1,433 tests
among the 1,500 tests covering 40 companies and 1,208 establishments. Responses
are considered positive when the recruiter has expressed an interest (by telephone
or e-mail) by offering a telephone or face-to-face interview or more rarely, by indi-
cating that he/she wishes further details on the application received. Responses are
considered rejections when a message has been received that indicates the appli-
cation has not been accepted and/or that the offer has already been filled. Finally,
for some applications, no reply was received3.
2.2 Level of discrimination differs by HR organization
Selections made through a centralized HR department concern slightly less than
two-thirds of the tests (Table 1). Moreover, they are non-existent for six of the 40
companies in our sample, whereas they are systematic for 18 of them, particularly
in the banking/insurance sector. In 16 companies, the organization of recruitment
varies across establishments and offers.
The share of tests for which selection via a centralized HR department is involved
is identical for female and male pairs (Table 2). Moreover, significant variations are
observed depending on the level of education of the applicants and the characteris-
tics of the position. Recruitment made through a centralized HR department more
often concern positions involving management functions and permanent positions.
Significant variations are also observed depending on the occupation. Within each
sector, applications for the most senior positions in the hierarchy generally involve
a more centralized HR department. Moreover, and notably, the bank/insurance
sector is strongly marked by the centralization of recruitment, because few ap-
professional HR departments external to the establishment concerned by the offer and insofar as
the case is infrequent, we associate this method of selecting applications with selections made by
a centralized HR department. For simplicity, we then refer only to the notion of centralized HR
departments.
3Automatically generated acknowledgements of receipt are not considered responses, except for
those indicating that ”the application will be considered rejected if no response is made before X
weeks.”
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Table 1: Share of tests for which a centralized HR department is involved per
company
# of # of Centralized HR
Company establishments tests Share (%)
AA 37 39 0.0
AB 24 30 70.0
AC 26 29 100.0
AD 28 38 0.0
AE 33 38 100.0
AF 34 34 100.0
AG 37 40 50.0
AH 33 39 100.0
AI 38 39 100.0
AJ 35 39 100.0
AK 38 38 100.0
AL 29 35 100.0
AM 36 40 37.5
AN 26 29 100.0
AO 30 36 0.0
AP 34 40 100.0
AQ 23 34 44.1
AR 37 40 60.0
AS 27 30 100.0
AT 22 38 47.4
AU 31 38 47.4
AV 35 40 22.5
AW 29 30 50.0
AX 28 39 2.6
AY 15 30 100.0
AZ 19 29 69.0
BA 30 34 100.0
BB 15 30 53.3
BC 34 40 0.0
BD 32 38 47.4
BE 32 39 0.0
BF 21 26 65.4
BG 31 40 100.0
BH 30 38 100.0
BI 35 38 100.0
BJ 24 28 46.4
BK 29 33 100.0
BL 37 38 100.0
BM 38 40 0.0
BN 36 40 7.5
Total 1,208 1,433 61.7
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more;
France.
Source: ISM CORUM-Dares.
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plications are selected at the establishment level. Finally, offers from companies
showing their commitment to diversity are more often those for which a central-
ized HR department is involved. This result suggests that the centralization of the
HR function is not neutral from a discrimination perspective.
Table 3 provides the raw results. Where the selection is managed solely within the
establishment, the success rate decreased to 25.5% for ”North African” applications
and remains relatively high for ”French” applications (41.3%). When a centralized
HR department is involved, ”North African” applications are selected in 43.8% of
cases compared with 50.6% of the ”French” applications.
It shows that hires made solely at the establishment level generate a higher level of
discrimination than hires involving a centralized HR department. The difference
in the positive response rate between ”North African” and ”French” applications
is 15.8 points for recruitment made only at establishment level compared with 6.8
points when a centralized HR department is involved.4
We can split the share of positive responses between favoritism for one origin ver-
sus another (either the ”French” application has been favored compared to the
”North African” application or the other way around) and equality of treatment
(both applications have been either accepted or rejected). Overall, it shows that fa-
voritism towards French applicants is much higher than towards ”North African”
applicants. When we distinguish by organization of recruitment, we observe that
favoritism towards North African applicants remains the same whatever the type
of HR organization (3.6% versus 4%), whereas it decreases dramatically for French
applicants when the HR organization is centralized. It is due to the fact that both
types of applicants receive more often positive responses in this case (39.8% vs
21.9%).
Therefore, it means that the organization of recruitment affects the level of discrim-
ination. We can identify several reasons :
(i) Members of HR departments are more aware of discrimination and its pre-
vention, unlike managers in charge of recruitment within the establishment.
An increasing number of companies have become more involved in order to
comply with the legislation in the fight against discrimination in recruitment.
The company’s HR departments are probably more systematically involved
than others in these actions. In addition to drawing up charters or pacts
4The observed gaps remain after controlling for observable characteristics (See 8 in Appendix).
Differences in characteristics of job offers and applications are therefore not sufficient to explain the
observed difference.
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Table 2: Share of tests for which selection is involved via a centralized HR depart-
ment
Centralized HR
% # of tests
All tests 61.7 1,433
By sex
Women 61.7 718
Men 61.7 715
Diploma
Vocational training 45.6 228
Bachelor 51.0 300
Bachelor + 2 years 57.3 623
Bachelor + 3 years 71.0 131
Bachelor + 4 years 77.3 22
Bachelor + 5 years 93.0 129
Experience
3 years 56.5 23
4 years 70.7 232
5 years 57.5 372
6 years 50.8 195
9 years 65.4 390
10 years 54.0 126
11 years 69.2 78
12 years 100.0 17
Management position 71.8 699
Labor contract
Permanent 64.1 1,122
Fixed-term 50.4 260
Unknown 66.7 51
Occupations
Sales and technical sales managers 86.4 103
Retail store operators and intermediaries 59.6 198
Self-service employees 48.3 58
Sellers 34.8 259
Banking and insurance managers 100.0 94
Banking and insurance employees 98.7 80
Banking and insurance technicians 93.4 121
Hotel, cafe and restaurant managers 74.7 91
Hotel and catering employees and operators 30.4 181
Cooks 60.5 248
Company involved in diversity 71.1 757
Reading: Out of 1433 tests carried out, 61.7% of the pairs of applica-
tions are selected by a centralized HR department within the company.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1,000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
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Table 3: Success rate and preferences for ”French” and ”North African” applica-
tions
% Positive responses % Preferences Equality # of tests
”French” ”North
African”
”French” ”North
African”
of Treat-
ment
All tests 47.0 36.8 14.1 3.8 32.9 1433
Tests by recruitment organization
At the est. level 41.3 25.5 19.5 3.6 21.9 549
Centralized HR 50.6 43.8 10.7 4.0 39.8 884
Reading: Applications of French origin interested recruiters, exclusively or not, in 47.0% of cases
against 36.8% for ”North African” applications.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1,000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
for equal treatment, these may include the dissemination of guides aimed at
overturning stereotypes, the financing of requested tests aimed at evaluating
and rethinking recruitment practices, the creation of tools for tracking recruit-
ment processes (to provide recruiters with greater incentives to motivate their
choices), or the implementation of training campaigns on non-discrimination.
Large companies are more concerned about non-discrimination training, in-
sofar as the ”Equality and Citizenship” law obliges, since January 2017, all
personnel in charge of recruitment in large companies to receive training in
non-discrimination at least every 5 years.
(ii) The second reason is that HR departments have more time dedicated to HR
tasks and therefore to recruitment, unlike operational staff whose primary
function is not recruitment. Giving more time to the selection of applicants
reduces the risk that choices are based on automatism or stereotypes (Chugh,
2004; Bartosˇ et al., 2016).
(iii) Finally, professional HR departments are probably less subject to field con-
straints than managers in charge of recruitment. For example, managers
are more tempted to adapt to consumer preferences than HR professionals
(Combes et al., 2016), or to seek to maintain a certain homogeneity of teams
to facilitate their management.5 Thus, some of these constraints can generate
5More diverse teams may be more difficult to manage, particularly because of the preferences of
current employees (Becker, 1957), which may have an effect on productivity (Hamilton et al., 2004),
while Kurtulus (2011) shows that the impact of origin or gender does not raise any issues within
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discriminatory behavior.
2.3 Endogeneity Issue
The implication of a centralized HR department potentially contains an endogene-
ity issue. A cost-benefit trade-off is inherent in the choice of using a centralized HR
department: Centralizing recruitment can, through standardization, reduce costs,
but decentralizing recruitment within each establishment can increase responsive-
ness (less administrative intermediaries) and adaptation to the local context. Un-
observables can influence the probability that the selection is managed by a cen-
tralized HR department and the existence of discrimination. Based on company
monographs, the qualitative work of Fondeur (2013, 2014) shows that the central-
ization of HR departments is generally linked in part to a strategy of better control
of recruitment combined with the ambition of protecting oneself from the risks of
discrimination. This phenomenon can bias the analysis in either direction.
On the one hand, companies with a proactive anti-discrimination culture (which
cannot be observed in our data) could be less likely to discriminate and more
likely to rely on a centralized HR department. The negative correlation observed
between using a centralized HR department and the level of discrimination would
then partly reflect this unobservable element. Thus, the impact of the involvement
of centralized HR departments on discrimination would lead to an overestimation.
On the other hand, companies would favor the use of a centralized HR depart-
ment for job offers most at risk in terms of discrimination (e.g., if strong pressure is
linked to consumer preferences or to maintain teams of homogeneous workers to
not disrupt management). Such a bias in the ”use of a centralized HR department”
treatment would lead to an underestimation of the impact of the involvement of
centralized HR departments on the degree of discrimination. However, measuring
this impact is not straightforward and requires the implementation of an appropri-
ate econometric strategy.
3 Impact of HR organization on hiring discrimination
We propose an evaluation of the causal link between the implication of a centralized
HR department and the probability that the ”French” application will be favored
companies.
10
based on the use of an instrumental strategy and a recursive bivariate probit model
(cf. Maddala (1983) and Wooldridge (2010)).
3.1 Instrumental strategy
We need an instrumental variable that is correlated with the HR organization but
not linked to hiring discrimination. To achieve this goal, we propose two different
instrumental variables that are not correlated with a discriminatory behavior: (i)
the company is a franchisor and (ii) the establishment is a franchisee. The sec-
ond one is more precise but we do not have this status for all establishments and
consequently lose some observations.
The franchisors that have developed a franchise network consent to establishments
using their brand and give support and expertise to franchisees in exchange for
a fee.6 However all establishments of a franchisor are not necessarily franchisees
even if they generally operate with some autonomy. By developing a franchise
network, franchisors acquire a better knowledge of the advantages due to the au-
tonomy of their establishments (e.g., better adaptation to the local context, greater
responsiveness, and shorter recruitment times). Thus, it is possible that compa-
nies that have developed franchisees entrust both franchisees and non-franchisees
establishments with more tasks, including in terms of recruitment. Our results
clearly indicate that the use of a centralized HR department is less frequent (a 0.37
point less probability) when the establishment concerned by the offer belongs to a
franchising company.
Concerning franchisees, they have by definition a certain independence, primarily
financial. But it also likely concerns other aspects of company management, in-
cluding recruitment. Even if certain agreements with the franchisor impose a right
of supervision in the recruitment (Truss, 2004), franchisees more frequently control
their hiring than non-franchise establishments.
Furthermore, our two instrumental variables (i) the company is a franchisor and
(ii) the establishment is a franchisee do not affect the likelihood that the employer
will adopt a discriminatory attitude. According to the literature on discrimination,
employers’ discriminatory behavior may be driven by three different motives. First,
it could be the unconscious prejudices of employers (see Bertrand et al. (2005) and
Rooth (2007)). Discriminatory behavior can also be linked to recruiters’ beliefs
about the productivity of certain demographic groups (statistical discrimination;
6See Appendix B for more details on franchises.
11
see Phelps (1972)). Finally, discrimination may also result from the preferences
of employers, employees or consumers (Becker (1957); Combes et al. (2016) for
consumer preferences). To our knowledge, there is no direct link between being a
franchisor or a franchisee and discriminatory behavior.
According to the literature on franchising, there is no link between franchisors and
discrimination. Being a franchisor is essentially linked to commercial purposes
and the type of activity (see Appendix B). Blair and Lafontaine (2005) suggest, in
particular, that large companies have an overall economic and financial interest
in developing a franchise network. Above all, however, if not all of companies
(approximately one third of the companies in our sample) do so, it is essentially
because their main activity does not allow it. As the authors indicate, two essential
conditions must be fulfill. First, products must be made relatively uniform between
establishments. Second, the risks and costs associated with a possible deterioration
of the brand image by a franchisee must be limited, which is again essentially
due to the nature of the production. Nevertheless, if certain activities are more
confronted with the question of consumer preference towards the company’s em-
ployees, franchising and the level of discrimination are both linked to the type of
activity. However being a franchisor and occupations in contact with the public
are not correlated, the coefficient of correlation is 0.03. Moreover, we control for
occupations in our estimates. Consequently, the determinants of franchising are
not linked to the existence of discriminatory behavior from recruiters.
Regarding the case where the employer is a franchisee, the literature shows that
their main characteristics are their desire for financial independence and their ex-
pectations in terms of the franchisor’s support and experience in order to ensure
the smooth running of the business (Appendix B). Thus, in some cases, hiring is
likely to be highly supervised by the franchisor (Truss, 2004) and in other cases,
franchisors grant a certain autonomy to their franchisees to ensure franchisees are
free to adapt to the context in which they work (Brander and Croonen, 2010). There
is therefore a priori no reason why the recruitment practices of franchises should
be more or less discriminatory than those of other employers, because the determi-
nants of discrimination are of a completely different nature. A possible argument
could be that franchisees are partly independent; thus, franchisees are better able
to express preferences for types of applicants or stereotypes or beliefs leading to
discriminatory recruitment. Two counterarguments must to be mentioned. Fran-
chisees are not totally independent entrepreneurs but independent ”under control”
(Feldstead, 1993b). Entrepreneurs who want complete autonomy would probably
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not have chosen to open a franchise. Moreover, another possibility is that recruiters
in non-franchised institutions also express, to some extent, preferences, stereotypes
or beliefs. The results in Table 4 confirm our intuitions as, when we separate the
type of recruitment, there is no direct effect of franchise on hiring discrimination;
thus, there merely might be an indirect effect through the organization of recruit-
ment (franchisees more often recruit at the establishment level).7
Table 4: Probability that the French application is favored for each type of recruit-
ment organization and according to the existence or not of a franchise network
(probit model)
Centralized HR Selection at the estab-
lishment level
Franchisees network 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Controls No Yes No Yes
# of obs 1,768 1,768 1,098 1,098
Reading: the difference between the application rates of ”French” and
”North African” origin that interested recruiters increases by 0.04 pp.
when there is a franchise network and in the case where the selection of
applications is made only within the establishment; but this difference
is not significant. Standard errors are in brackets. Asterisks indicate
statistically significant deviations at thresholds of 1% ***, 5% ** and
10% *.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more;
France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
Differentiating establishments according to whether they belong to a franchisor
allows us to separate establishments that have a high probability of operating rel-
atively independently from the other establishments in terms of recruitment. We
estimate the following bivariate recursive probit model:
Pos f renchij = 1[δ HRij + γ Xij + µij > 0] (1)
where Pos f renchij is a variable equals to 1, for application pair i, if the applicant
of ”French” origin has interested the recruiter of company j and 0 otherwise; Xij
is a vector of characteristics of application pair i and company j, whose content
7As above, franchisees activities and occupations in contact with the public are not correlated,
the coefficient of correlation is 0.05.
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varies according to the specifications adopted; µij is the error term, clustered by
company; and HRij is a dummy indicating the level of recruitment, centralized or
not, that the applicant in pair i faces when applying for a post in company j, this
variable is endogenous and estimated from the probit model.
HRij = 1[ζ Franchiseij + φχij + νij > 0] (2)
where Franchiseij is an indicator of the existence (or not) of a franchise network in
company j (our instrumental variable), and νij is the error term. The vector Xij and
χij include all variables available on the applicants and companies tested. We also
include ”region” fixed effects to control for local economic context. However, we do
not include a ”company” fixed effect. Because some companies use a centralized
HR department for all their recruitments (Table 1), the concomitant introduction
of the recruitment organization type indicator and a ”company” fixed effect would
involve collinearity and would be likely to disrupt evaluation. To improve the
evaluation of the interest of considering an instrument on measuring the impact
of using a centralized HR department, we compare the results of the recursive
bivariate probit model (Equations 1 and 2) with those of a simple probit model
including the variable ”use of a centralized HR department”.
3.2 Results
The empirical results are summarized in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the
estimates of the recursive bivariate probit using (i) the company is a franchisor, (ii)
the establishment is a franchisee as instrumental variables, respectively. Column
(3) shows the result of the simple probit model. All controls are available in Tables
10 and 11 in Appendix.
The results indicate that the impact of involving a centralized HR department is
higher when we instrument. This result shows that when we correct for endogene-
ity (Columns (1) and (2)), the probability that the ”French” applicant is favored is
by roughly 0.30 points less when the selection involves a centralized HR depart-
ment, whereas it is 0.10 points lower in the case of a naive estimate (Column (3)).8.
The significance of the negative correlation between the unexplained elements of
our two variables of interest (cf. the terms atrho and ρ) also confirms the valid-
8Table 12 in Appendix shows that HR organization has no impact on favoritism for ”North
African” applicants, as suggested by descriptive statistics in Table 3.
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ity of our estimation strategy for the main instrument but also for the alternative
one. Unobservable characteristics simultaneously influence the probability that the
recruiter has a discriminatory attitude and that a centralized HR department is in-
volved in recruitment. In other words, the companies for which a centralized HR
department is involved are places in which the discriminatory risk is the greatest
and for which the effect of using the centralized HR department is lower (lead-
ing to an underestimation of the effect by means of an uncorrected estimate). Our
econometric strategy allows us to correct this bias.
This result is also confirmed by the estimations on subsamples (Appendix, Table 13
by gender; Table 14 without the banking/insurance sector, where applications are
mostly selected by a centralized HR department). The effect of the organization of
recruitment on discrimination is therefore a priori relatively homogeneous, except
for the occupations. In particular, considering the organization of recruitment re-
duces the level of discrimination compared with the reference group for the retail
and hotel and catering sectors, and it tends to increase for the banking and insur-
ance sectors, for which the centralization of the HR function is higher (Table 2).
These observations indicate a downward effect of the centralization of recruitment
on the level of discrimination.
4 Conclusion
Based on a correspondence study, our results show a significant risk of hiring dis-
crimination for workers with a North African origin in large companies in France.
The results confirm the raw results observed by Foroni et al. (2016), even when
we control for observable characteristics. One of the original features of this re-
sult is that the discriminatory risk is lower than the one detected by most of the
experiments conducted in France on the same origins. Unlike other experiments,
this study concerns only large companies in different sectors. We show that the
use of centralized HR departments in the recruitment of applicants, instead of
recruitments made only within the establishment (often by operational staff and
not HR professional) plays an important role in the degree of discrimination for
”North-African” applicants: the process results in around 0.3 point decrease in the
probability that ”North African” applicants are discriminated against compared
with ”French” applicants.
This result suggests that acting on the organization of recruitment in large com-
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Table 5: Likelihood that the ”French” application will be favored
(1) (2) (3)
Recursive probit Recursive probit Probit
”French” Centralized ”French” Centralized ”French”
favored HR dep. favored HR dep. favored
IV 1 IV 2
Centralized HR -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.10***
department (0.09) (0.09) (0.02)
The company is a -0.36***
franchisor (0.10)
The establishment is a -0.21***
franchisee (0.02)
Occupations
Retail store operators -0.02 -0.22** -0.05 -0.27*** 0.01
and intermediaries (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Self-service employees -0.12* -0.23 -0.17** -0.48*** -0.08*
(0.06) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04)
Sellers (retail) -0.06 -0.37*** -0.12 -0.66*** 0.01
(0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Banking and insurance 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.04* 0.02
managers (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
Banking and insurance 0.22*** 0.10 0.18** 0.03 0.18**
employees (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08)
Banking and insurance 0.08 -0.19 0.07 -0.07* 0.05
technicians (0.06) (0.20) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
Hotel, cafe and 0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.23*** 0.04
restaurant managers (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Hotel/catering employees -0.06 -0.38*** -0.12 -0.73*** 0.01
and operators (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Cooks -0.05 -0.25* -0.12 -0.43*** -0.02
(0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Pseudo R2 0.06
atrho 0.64 (p-value=0.04) 0.79 (p-value=0.03)
rho 0.57 0.66
LR test of rho = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0.04 Prob > chi2 = 0.03
Log pseudolikelihood -1194.225 -903.319 -549.575
# of obs 1,433 1,160 1,433
Note: This estimation is controlled for age, age squared, sex, diploma, labor contract, management
position, experience, diversity label, order of application, regions. Asterisks indicate statistically sig-
nificant differences at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% * thresholds.
Reading: The probability that the ”French” application is favored decreases by 29 pp. when a central-
ized HR department is involved (column (1)).
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
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panies can be considered an effective tool in the fight against discrimination in
recruitment, at least for the first stage of recruitment, i.e. before interviews. The
professionalization of the recruitment position is therefore a potential solution in
the fight against discrimination in recruitment, and this aspect, according to our
review of the literature, has never been highlighted by a study of this type.
Notably, further exploration of the mechanisms at work is crucial. Indeed, we do
not know to what extent this effect is linked to the following: (i) HR profession-
als are better trained and more aware of discrimination than managers, (ii) HR
professionals are further away from field issues (considering customer preferences
or team management issues can generate discriminatory hiring behavior to which
managers are probably more sensitive), or (iii) HR professionals have more time
they can dedicate to recruitment, which allows them to make their selection more
on the basis of assessing applicants’ skills and less on the basis of stereotypes.
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A Data Collection and design
A.1 Selection of firms and occupations
The selected companies are multi-establishment companies or franchise networks
with more than 1,000 employees in the trade, bank/insurance, and hotel/catering
sectors. The sectors have been chosen to ensure they include several large compa-
nies with a significant number of vacant positions for a small number of occupa-
tions. The companies targeted during the design of the experiment that did not
publish a sufficient number of offers were excluded from the experiment. Finally,
only companies with several dozen offers published on their website in March 2016,
for ten relatively common occupations, were selected. This sample comprises 40
companies: 30 were tested 40 times and 10 were tested 30 times (Table 6). Applica-
tions were sent only in response to job offers.
Some characteristics also affected the selection of job offers. In particular, one ob-
jective of this study was that half of the offers should be managerial positions and
the other half non-managerial positions. Moreover, permanent and fixed-term con-
tracts were selected. More than three quarters of the positions provide permanent
contracts, the remaining one quarter of the positions provide mainly fixed-term
contracts.
To have a sufficient number of tests per company, job offers are located through-
out France. In this analysis, we eliminated tests that concern job offers with an
unknown location. We also exclude the invalid tests due to the withdrawal of the
offer by the employer between the two applications. Overall, we retain 1,433 tests
among the 1,500 tests. Table 6 shows the distribution by region. Approximately
one quarter of the job offers are located in the Ile-de-France region (Paris), the
Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes region is also widely represented with 13.5% of the offers.
Table 6 also shows that for over half of the offers tested, the company shows on its
website a commitment to diversity, equal treatment and/or the fight against dis-
criminatory risks linked to the criterion of origin. This indicator does not take into
account mentions concerning other criteria (e.g., disability, professional equality
between women and men).
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics concerning the tested job offers
% # tests
Occupation
Sales and technical sales managers 7.2 103
Retail Store Operators and Intermediaries[1] 13.8 198
Self-Service Employees 4 58
Sellers 18 259
Banking and insurance managers[2] 6.6 94
Banking and insurance employees 5.8 80
Banking and insurance technicians 8.4 121
Hotel, cafe and restaurant managers 6.3 91
Hotel and catering employees and operators 12.6 181
Cooks 17.3 248
Region
Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes 13.5 193
Bourgogne-Franche-Comte 4.4 63
Bretagne 4 57
Centre-Val de Loire 4.1 60
Grand Est 8 115
Hauts-de-France 5.7 82
Ile-de-France 24.3 348
Normandie 5.1 73
Nouvelle-Aquitaine 8.2 117
Occitanie 7.2 103
Pays de la Loire 5.9 85
PACA 9.6 137
Management position 48.8 699
Labor contract
CDI (permanent) 78.3 1,122
CDD (fixed-term) 18.1 360
Unknown 3.6 51
Company committed to diversity 52.8 757
Sample 100 1,433
[1] Department managers, sales consultants, customer managers, shop managers.
[2] Agency managers, customer advisors.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1,000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
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A.2 Profiles of fictitious applicants
Each pair of applications contains one application with a so-called ”North African”
sounding name and another with a so-called ”French” sounding name.9 The other
criteria are identical for each applicant in the same pair, including the indication of
French nationality. Compared with the tests usually carried out, the experimenta-
tion on which we rely required the use of a relatively large number of profiles for
two reasons. First, this correspondence study targets a greater number of occupa-
tions than the other studies in the literature. Consequently, we considered it was
necessary to create profiles adapted to each occupation and each sector. Second,
because several applications were potentially sent to the same recruiters, special
attention also had to be paid to the increased risk of detection, which also explains
some variations in terms of experience, age, or diploma. This limitation led to the
use of 147 pairs of applications for 1,500 tests, where each pair consists of two re-
sumes and two cover letters. For each application of the same pair, permutations
were made from one test to another between the ”North African” and ”French”
origins in order to avoid possible biases linked to the quality of resumes and cover
letters. Permutations were also made from one test to another to ensure the appli-
cation first sent evokes either a ”North African” origin, or a ”French” origin. Of the
1,433 tests selected for this study, resumes are almost equally distributed by gen-
der (Table 7). Moreover, the age of the applicants is between 20 and 36 years, their
level of diploma is from lower than bachelor to graduate, and they have medium
experience (4 to 6 years for a little more than half of the resumes) or confirmed
experience (9 to 11 years). Finally, and notably, the residential locations of the
fictitious applicants are socially neutral.
A.3 Data collection
Applications were sent between April and July 2016 with a 1-day spacing between
the two applications for low-skilled job offers, which was sometimes reduced to
half a day to test companies recruiting within very short deadlines; and a time
limit of up to 3 working days for tests concerning the most qualified applications,
or a little longer when responding to offers for which qualified applications are
potentially rare. In all cases, the objective was not to risk arousing recruiters’
9Relatively common surnames and given names for each origin were chosen, for example Malika
SAYED, Aure´lie FAVRE, Malik BOUNA or Guillaume CLERC.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics concerning applicants
% # tests
Gender
Women 50.1 718
Men 49.9 715
Age (min =20, max=36) 26.3 1433
Diploma
Vocational training 15.9 228
Bachelor 20.9 300
Bachelor + 2 years 43.5 623
Bachelor + 3 years 9.1 131
Bachelor + 4 years 1.5 22
Bachelor + 5 years 9 129
Experience
3 years 1.6 23
4 years 16.2 232
5 years 26 372
6 years 13.6 195
9 years 27.2 390
10 years 8.8 126
11 years 5.4 78
12 years 1.2 17
First sent application
”French” 49.3 706
”North African” 50.7 727
Sample 100 1,433
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1,000 employees or more;
France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
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suspicions. Both applications were always sent in the same manner, using the
application form proposed on the website where the offer was published or, less
frequently, by e-mail. Responses were collected until August 31, 2016.
Information on the organization of recruitment was collected in two steps. First,
during the elaboration of the experiment, several types of information were crossed.
Information on the identity and/or function of the recruiter may have been col-
lected from the information provided for some of the job advertisements. Where
appropriate, this information has been cross-checked with information appearing
on company websites regarding how recruitment is organized. The identity and/or
function of the person who sent the reply message or acknowledgement was also
considered. In a second stage, this information was cross-checked with that gath-
ered during meetings with representatives of each company at the Ministry of
Labour. This second stage made it possible to either validate or specify the organi-
zation of recruitment for each offer, i.e. whether an HR department external to the
establishment was involved.
A.4 Estimation of success rate by origin
Results show that 50.8% of the tests received at least a positive reply from the em-
ployer. This relatively high return rate reveals the good quality of the applications
and a certain tension in the job market for at least some of the occupations we are
considering.
Using a bivariate probit model, we control for firm and individual characteristics:
Successij = 1[β Frenchi + δ RHij + γ Xij + µij > 0] (3)
where Successij is a variable equals to 1 if the applicant has interested the recruiter
of company j and 0 otherwise; Frenchi equals 1 if the applicant has a French sound-
ing name; Xij is a vector of characteristics of application pair i and company j,
whose content varies according to the specifications adopted; µij is the error term,
clustered by company; and RHij is a dummy indicating the level of recruitment,
centralized or not, that the applicant in pair i faces when applying for a post in
company j, this variable is endogenous and estimated from the probit model. The
estimate of β is summarized in Table 8 depending on different specification of the
model.
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Table 8: Differences in success rates between ”French” and ”North African” app.
according to the type of recruitment organization (bivariate probit)
Differences in success rates
β between ”French” and ”North
African” applications
All tests 10.3*** 10.2*** 10.3*** 10.2***
# obs 2,866 (1.83) (1.07) (1.07) (1.06)
By recruitment organization
At the etab. level 15.8*** 15.7*** 15.6*** 15.4***
# obs 1,098 (2.81) (1.85) (1.82) (1.82)
Centralized RH 6.8** 6.8*** 6.8*** 6.9***
# obs 1,768 (2.37) (1.26) (1.26) (1.26)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE No No Yes Yes
Company FE No No No Yes
Reading: The difference between the application rates of
”French” and ”North African” origin that interested the re-
cruiters is 10.3 pp. without controls and 10.2 pp. taking into
account the effects of structures and fixed effects of regions and
companies. The correction is based on the estimation of a pro-
bit model and, to account for the difference, the calculation of
a marginal effect for the f renchi variable. Standard deviations
are grouped by test. Variables to correct for ”composition ef-
fects” include age, gender, degree level, experience and gender
of the pair, type of contract, position level (managerial or non-
managerial), first application sent for the test (”North African”
or ”French”), occupation concerned by the test and company
commitment to diversity. Standard errors are in brackets. Aster-
isks indicate statistically significant deviations at thresholds of
1% ***, 5% ** and 10% *.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1,000 employees or more;
France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
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A.5 Heteroscedastic Probit
Heckman and Siegelman (1993) suggest that the differences measured by the test-
ing method between two identical candidates (except for the criterion tested) do not
necessarily reflect discrimination linked to employers’ preferences (Becker, 1957) or
”classical” statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972) linked to the attribution by em-
ployers of different levels of productivity to two candidates of the same pair. These
differences may also be related to productivity being imperfectly observed by em-
ployers. Even if employers assign similar levels of productivity to two candidates
in the same pair, there is no reason why the variances should be the same. Thus,
there is uncertainty about the candidates’ skills, which may vary in either direction,
that may lead to differences in treatment of similar resumes and perceived average
productivity levels between the two candidates. Some refer to this as ”second-order
statistical discrimination”.
The heteroscedastic probit works as follows. No matter how complete the resumes,
the productivity of candidates is imperfectly observed by employers and the prob-
ability of accurately evaluating the application contains a portion of unobservables
from the employers’ perspective. Thus, even if employers assign similar average
unobservable skills to each of the two applicants in the same pair, they may as-
sign different variances for the unobservable share of skills for the two applicants.
These differences in terms of variances in the unobservable share of skills may
lead recruiters to make different choices regarding the two candidates in the same
pair when these are similar from the perspective of the designers of the experience
and employers do not express differences in taste and think that the two types of
candidates are on average equally competent. Either candidate may be favored de-
pending on the circumstances. For example, depending on whether the candidates
have high or low average skill levels, the candidate with the greatest variance in
unobservable skills may be rejected or preferred.
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Table 9: Differences between the ”French” and ”North African” application rates
that interested recruiters corrected for structural effects and fixed effects for region
and company (probit and heteroscedastic probit)
All tests Women Men
Probit 10.2*** 8.0*** 12.4***
(1.06) (1.49) (1.49)
Heteroscedastic Probit 10.2*** 8.1*** 12.2***
Wald test (p-value): there is a difference between the
standard deviations of non-observables influencing
the success rates of ”French” and ”North African”
applications
(1.06) (1.51) (1.47)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes Yes Yes
# applications 2,866 1,436 1,430
Reading: the difference between the ”French” and ”North African” application rates
that interested recruiters is 10.2 percentage points, taking into account the effects of
structures and the fixed effects of regions and companies. The correction is based
on the estimation, as appropriate, of a probit model or a heteroskedastic probit
model and, to account for the difference, the calculation of a marginal effect for
the Frenchi variable. Standard deviations are grouped by test. The variables used
to correct for ”structural effects” include the age of the pair of applications, the
degree level of the pair, the experience of the pair, the type of contract, the level
of the position (management or not), the first application sent for the test (”North
African” or ”French”), the occupation concerned by the test (except for assessments
by occupation), the company’s commitment to diversity and the gender of the pair
of applications (except for assessments by gender). Standard errors are in brackets.
Asterisks indicate statistically significant deviations at thresholds of 1% ***, 5% **
and 10% *.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM CORUM-Dares.
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B Franchising
Franchising is a commercial relationship between a franchisee and a franchisor. But
the franchise remains difficult to define because it varies considerably by country
and there is no global definition of the phenomenon. In the literature, franchising
has been defined as a pure sales method (Mendelsohn (2006), Srinivasan (2006))
or as a means of entrepreneurial cooperation (Shane and Hoy, 1996). Sherman
(2004) presents franchising primarily as a strategic relationship between individ-
uals, bounded by laws specific to the countries in which they operate (Hoffman
and Preble, 2004). The French Franchise Federation defines franchising as a mode
of collaboration between two legally and financially independent companies. The
franchisor makes available the signs of customer rallying (brand and banner, ar-
chitectural concept, visual identity system), the expertise of its brand and technical
and commercial assistance. The franchisee must develop and maintain the brand
image, improve expertise and respect the brand concept. A franchise therefore en-
ables a self-employed person to start up more quickly by optimizing chances of
success and a franchisor to base commercial development on a network of business
managers involved in the local market. The relationship between a franchisor and
a franchisee is broadly described as a low-cost expansion strategy for the franchisor
and a means for the franchisee to run its business with logistical and strategic sup-
port from the franchisor. The management research literature has focused on the
relationship between franchisee and franchisor and the benefits for each in that
relationship. In particular, for the franchisor, a strategy is to replicate its business
model and management system (Hoy et al., 2017). An individual’s decision to be-
come a franchisee generally stems from a desire to become independent (Feldstead
(1993a), Kaufmann and Stanworth (1995), Peterson and Dant (1990)). As franchis-
ing allows individuals seeking greater autonomy and independence, with little or
no prior experience (Kaufmann, 1999) or technical knowledge (Williams, 1999) to
enter the market, there is an expectation on the part of franchisees that the fran-
chisor will provide the necessary support for the business to be successful (Hoy
et al., 2017). Some of the literature has studied the specificities of franchises in
terms of human resources management. Castrogiovanni and Kidwell (2010) in-
vestigated at management differences between the manager of the unit being an
employee of the franchisor and the owner of the unit. They show that the dif-
ferences are based on entrepreneurial orientation capabilities, the application of
franchise characteristics and the lesser adverse selection effects for owners. Truss
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(2004) shows that, in the franchise network he studied, franchisors have a right to
control hiring and human resource management, and in particular the most expe-
rienced employees.
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C Additional Results
Table 10: Likelihood that the ”French” application will be favored (IV1 - the com-
pany is a franchisor)
(1) (2)
Recursive bivariate probit Probit
”French” Centralized ”French”
app favored RH dep. app favored
Centralized HR department -0.29*** -0.10***
(0.09) (0.02)
Existence of a franchise net-
work
-0.36***
(0.03)
Age -0.04 -0.02 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Men 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Diploma
Vocational training 0.02 -0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Bachelor + 2 years -0.04 -0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Bachelor + 3 years 0.01 0.05 -0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Bachelor + 4 years 0.11 0.06 0.07
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Bachelor + 5 years 0.01 0.10 -0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Experience
3 years -0.01 0.09 -0.00
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
4 years -0.06 0.03 -0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
5 years -0.11** -0.02 -0.10**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
6 years -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
9 years Ref Ref Ref
10 years -0.06* -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
11 years 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Continued on next page
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(1) (2)
Recursive bivariate probit Probit
12 years -0.02 1.65*** -0.08
(0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Occupations
Retail store operators -0.02 -0.22*** 0.01
and intermediaries (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Self-service employees -0.12** -0.23*** -0.08
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Sellers -0.06 -0.37*** 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Banking and insurance
managers
0.03 0.14*** 0.02
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Banking and insurance em-
ployees
0.22*** 0.10* 0.18*
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Banking and insurance tech-
nicians
0.08 -0.19** 0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Hotel, cafe and restaurant
managers
0.04 -0.11** 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Hotel/catering employees -0.06 -0.38*** 0.01
and operators (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Cooks -0.05 -0.25*** -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Management position 0.00 0.04 -0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Labor contract
Permanent 0.03 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Unknown 0.04 0.08 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
First sent application ”North
African”
0.04** 0.01 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Region
Bourgogne-Franche-Comte 0.05 0.00 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Bretagne -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Centre-Val de Loire 0.01 -0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Grand Est -0.01 -0.08* 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Hauts-de-France 0.05 0.08 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
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(1) (2)
Recursive bivariate probit Probit
Ile-de-France 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Normandie -0.01 -0.07 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Nouvelle-Aquitaine -0.06* -0.10** -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Occitanie 0.03 -0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Pays de la Loire 0.02 -0.09* 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
PACA 0.01 -0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Company involved in diver-
sity
0.05** 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pseudo R2 0.06
atrho 0.64 (p-value=0,05)
rho 0.57
LR test of rho = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0.05
Log pseudolikelihood -1194,225 -549,575
# of tests 1,433 1,433
Reading: The probability that the ”French” application is favored decreases by 29 pp. when a
centralized HR department is involved (column (1)). Asterisks indicate statistically significant
differences at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% * thresholds.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
Table 11: Likelihood that the ”French” application will be favored (IV2 - the estab-
lishment is a franchisee)
(1) (2)
Recursive bivariate probit Probit
”French” Centralized ”French”
app favored RH dep. app favored
Centralized HR department -0.32*** -0.09***
(0.09) (0.02)
The establishment is a fran-
chise
-0.21***
(0.02)
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(1) (2)
Recursive bivariate probit Probit
Age -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Men 0.02 -0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Diploma
Vocational training -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Bachelor + 2 years -0.06 -0.03 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Bachelor + 3 years -0.02 0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Bachelor + 4 years 0.19 0.15 0.14
(0.17) (0.11) (0.18)
Bachelor + 5 years -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Experience
3 years -0.06 -0.00 -0.06
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
4 years -0.07 0.04 -0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
5 years -0.10** -0.02 -0.09**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
6 years -0.05 -0.08* -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
9 years Ref Ref Ref
10 years -0.04* -0.01 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
11 years 0.03 0.09 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
12 years 0.11 1.44*** -0.03
(0.13) (0.08) (0.12)
Occupations
Retail store operators -0.05 -0.27*** 0.00
and intermediaries (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Self-service employees -0.17** -0.48*** -0.08
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
Sellers -0.12 -0.66*** 0.00
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Banking and insurance
managers
0.03 0.04* 0.03
(0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
Banking and insurance em-
ployees
0.18** 0.03 0.18**
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
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(1) (2)
Recursive bivariate probit Probit
Banking and insurance tech-
nicians
0.07 -0.07* 0.06
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07)
Hotel, cafe and restaurant
managers
0.01 -0.23*** 0.03
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Hotel/catering employees -0.12 -0.73*** 0.02
and operators (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Cooks -0.12* -0.43*** -0.05
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Management position -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Labor contract
Permanent 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unknown 0.04 -0.01 0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
First sent application ”North
African”
0.04* 0.00 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Region
Bourgogne-Franche-Comte 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Bretagne -0.02 -0.03 -0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Centre-Val de Loire 0.02 -0.05 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Grand Est -0.04 -0.06* 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Hauts-de-France 0.03 0.05 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ile-de-France -0.02 -0.06 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Normandie -0.01 -0.10 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Nouvelle-Aquitaine -0.09** -0.09** -0.07*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Occitanie -0.03 -0.13** -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Pays de la Loire 0.01 -0.12** 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
PACA 0.01 -0.09** 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Company involved in diver-
sity
0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
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(1) (2)
Recursive bivariate probit Probit
Pseudo R2 0.06
atrho 0.79 (p-value=0.03)
rho 0.66
LR test of rho = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0.03
Log pseudolikelihood -903.319 -438.429
# of tests 1,160 1,160
Reading: The probability that the ”French” application is favored decreases by 32
pp. when a centralized HR department is involved (column (1)). Asterisks indicate
statistically significant differences at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% * thresholds.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
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Table 12: Likelihood that the ”North African” application will be favored
(1) (2) (3)
Recursive probit Recursive probit Probit
”N Afr” Centralized ”N Afr” Centralized ”N Afr”
favored RH dep. favored RH dep. favored
IV 1 IV 2
Centralized HR -0.003 -0.02 -0.01
department (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
The company is a -0.36***
franchisor (0.10)
The establishment is a -0.21**
franchisee (0.09)
Occupations
Retail store operators -0.04 -0.22** -0.05 -0.26** -0.04*
and intermediaries (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02)
Self-service employees -0.09*** -0.23 -0.11*** -0.48*** -
(0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.17) (-)
Sellers (retail) -0.04 -0.37*** -0.06 -0.68*** -0.003
(0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05)
Banking and insurance -0.04 0.14 -0.07 0.004 -0.04
managers (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Banking and insurance -0.005 0.10 -0.07 0.02 -0.005
employees (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Banking and insurance -0.01 -0.19 -0.03 -0.007 -0.02
technicians (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
Hotel, cafe and -0.06* -0.11 -0.08** -0.23** -0.06*
restaurant managers (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03)
Hotel/catering employees -0.09** -0.38*** -0.10** -0.73*** -0.08**
and operators (0.04) (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.03)
Cooks -0.07* -0.25* -0.06* -0.10*** -0.42***
(0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03)
Pseudo R2 0.06
atrho 0.14 (p-value=0.05) -0.01 (p-value=0.98)
rho 0.14 -0.01
# of obs 1,433 1,160 1,300
Note: This estimation is controlled for age, age squared, sex, diploma, labor contract, man-
agement position, experience, diversity label, order of application, regions. Asterisks indicate
statistically significant differences at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% * thresholds. In column (3), 133
observations are dropped (there are only 1,300 observations) because there is no variation in
terms of individual characteristics for these observations.
Reading: The probability that the ”French” application is favored decreases by 29 pp. when a
centralized HR department is involved (column (1)).
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM Corum-Dares.
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Table 13: Likelihood that the ”French” application will be favored by gender (IV1)
(1) (2)
Women Men
”French” Centralized ”French” Centralized
app favored RH dep. app favored RH dep.
Use of a centralized HR de-
partment
-0.19*** -0.40***
(0.11) (0.06)
Existence of a franchise net-
work
-0.35*** -0.35***
(0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Diploma
Vocational training -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Bachelor Ref Ref Ref Ref
Bachelor + 2 years 0.06 -0.05 0.11** 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Bachelor + 3 years 0.09 0.10 -0.07 0.04
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Bachelor + 4 years 0.26** 0.05 -0.08 0.05
(0.11) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14)
Bachelor + 5 years 0.17* 0.03 -0.18* 0.12
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Experience
3 years -0.12 0.05 0.10 0.18
(0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
4 years -0.13* 0.05 0.05 0.07
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
5 years -0.12 0.02 -0.10* -0.01
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
6 years -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
9 years Ref Ref Ref Ref
10 years -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
11 years 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.04
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
12 years 0.23 1.52*** -1.08*** 1.57***
(0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Occupations
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(1) (2)
Sales and technical sales
managers
Ref Ref Ref Ref
Retail store operators and
intermediaries
-0.03 -0.27*** -0.03 -0.018***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Self-service employees -0.07 -0.25*** -0.22* -0.30**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
Sellers -0.03 -0.37*** -0.14 -0.32***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Banking and insurance
managers
-0.01 1.17*** 0.08 1.15***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Banking and insurance em-
ployees
0.18** 1.31*** 0.15 0.18
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14)
Banking and insurance tech-
nicians
0.06 -0.21** 0.06 -0.18*
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Hotel, cafe and restaurant
managers
-0.04 -0.16* 0.10 -0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Hotel and catering employ-
ees and operators
-0.02 -0.39*** -0.12 -0.32***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Cooks -0.01 -0.27*** 0.11 -0.21***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Management position -0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Labor contract
Fixed-term Ref Ref Ref Ref
Permanent -0.01 0.03 0.05* 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Unknown 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
First sent application ”North
African”
0.03 -0.01 0.05* 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Region
Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes Ref Ref Ref Ref
Bourgogne-Franche-Comte 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Bretagne -0.10 -0.07 0.04 0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07)
Centre-Val de Loire 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
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(1) (2)
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Grand Est 0.05 -0.12* -0.06 -0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Hauts-de-France 0.11* 0.04 -0.01 0.14*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Ile-de-France 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Normandie -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Nouvelle-Aquitaine -0.09 -0.07 -0.09* -0.11**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Occitanie 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Pays de la Loire 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.20***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
PACA 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.10
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Company involved in diver-
sity
0.06** 0.06* 0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
atrho 0.36 (p-value=0.31) 1.25 (p-value=0.03)
rho 0.35 0.85
LR test of rho = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0.31 Prob > chi2 = 0.03
Log pseudolikelihood -565.138 -588.986
# of tests 718 715
Reading: The probability that the ”French” application is favored decreases by 29 pp. when a
centralized HR department is involved (column (1)). Asterisks indicate statistically significant
differences at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% * thresholds.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM CORUM-Dares.
Table 14: Likelihood that the ”French” application will be favored without the Bank
and insurance sector (IV 1)
(1)
Recursive bivariate probit
”French” Centralized
app favored RH dep.
Use of a centralized HR department -0.29***
(0.09)
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(1)
Existence of a franchise network -0.47***
(0.04)
Age -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.07)
Age squared 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Men 0.04** 0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Diploma
Vocational training 0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.05)
Bachelor Ref Ref
Bachelor + 2 years -0.03 -0.00
(0.03) (0.05)
Bachelor + 3 years -0.02 0.12**
(0.05) (0.06)
Bachelor + 4 years 0.17 0.0.14
(0.13) (0.13)
Bachelor + 5 years 0.13 0.23**
(0.10) (0.09)
Experience
3 years 0.02 0.03
(0.12) (0.15)
4 years -0.04 -0.00
(0.06) (0.08)
5 years -0.13** -0.06
(0.05) (0.06)
6 years -0.05 -0.07
(0.04) (0.05)
9 years Ref Ref
10 years -0.06 -0.08
(0.04) (0.06)
11 years 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.07)
12 years -0.01 1.85***
(0.12) (0.08)
Occupations
Sales and technical sales managers Ref Ref
Retail store operators and intermedi-
aries
-0.00 -0.27***
(0.05) (0.05)
Self-service employees -0.12** -0.19**
(0.07) (0.08)
Sellers -0.05 -0.35***
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(1)
(0.07) (0.07)
Hotel, cafe and restaurant managers 0.06 -0.13**
(0.07) (0.06)
Hotel and catering employees and op-
erators
-0.05 -0.39***
(0.07) (0.06)
Cooks -0.05 -0.39***
(0.07) (0.06)
Management position -0.01 0.11**
(0.04) (0.05)
Labor contract
Fixed-term Ref Ref
Permanent 0.04 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03)
Unknown 0.10* 0.13*
(0.06) (0.08)
First sent application ”North African” 0.04** 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Region
Auvergne-Rhoˆne-Alpes Ref Ref
Bourgogne-Franche-Comte 0.06 -0.01
(0.07) (0.08)
Bretagne 0.01 0.05
(0.05) (0.07)
Centre-Val de Loire -0.03 -0.05
(0.06) (0.07)
Grand Est -0.01 -0.09
(0.05) (0.06)
Hauts-de-France 0.04 0.11
(0.06) (0.07)
Ile-de-France -0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Normandie -0.04 -0.08
(0.05) (0.07)
Nouvelle-Aquitaine -0.08* -0.11**
(0.04) (0.06)
Occitanie -0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.06)
Pays de la Loire 0.03 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06)
PACA 0.00 0.04*
(0.02) (0.03)
Company involved in diversity 0.06** 0.04*
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(1)
(0.02) (0.03)
atrho 0.60 (p-value=0,06)
rho 0.54
LR test of rho = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0.06
Log pseudolikelihood -1030,554
# of tests 1,138
Reading: The probability that the ”French” application is favored decreases
by 29 pp. when a centralized HR department is involved (column (1)). Aster-
isks indicate statistically significant differences at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10%
* thresholds.
Scope: panel of 40 companies of 1000 employees or more; France.
Source: ISM CORUM-Dares.
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